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Constitutional adjudication and the individual —  
a post-socialist solution
The aim of this contribution is to show the physiology (and hope­
fully not the pathology) of a constitutional problem at a certain stage of 
post socialist constitutional development. I emphasize that although we 
jurists talk about laws and interpretative rules, the most important ele­
ment of constitutionalism is the constitutional mind — to put it so, — 
the attitude of the society and first of all of the decision makers towards 
constitutionalism. The paper first provides some information about 
essential changes in the Hungarian constitutional system concerning 
the individual’s procedural rights to the enforcement of their fundamen­
tal rights. Related to these procedural changes of 2012, the second part 
sheds light to a joint substancial issue, namely how this new system is 
capable to influence the scope of rights protection in individual’s pri­
vate matters.
l.The Hungarian Fundamental Law effective from 1 January 
2012 has significantly modified the competencies of the Constitutional 
Court and the role of the different constitutional institutions in consti­
tutional adjudication. Among several changes it introduced three types 
of constitutional complaints and abolished the former existing actio 
popularis. The system of actio popularis meant a legal possibility that 
anyone could turn to the Constitutional Court claiming that a law, legal 
provision or regulation is contrary to a constitutional provision. The 
petitioner could also request the annulment of that piece of law. Con­
stitutional complaint, under the former jurisdiction, was to be lodged 
only in case of personal injury caused by the application of an uncon­
stitutional norm.
The aim of the new constitutional complaint mechanisms was to 
protect against personal injuries caused by ordinary courts and pro­
vide a possibility for constitutional review also in cases where the
complainant cannot turn to ordinary court. Moreover, the Constitutional 
Court may supervise the constitutionality of legal provisions when they, 
applied in certain judicial cases, lead to an unconstitutional court deci­
sion. Besides, the new system encourages civil petitioners to turn to the 
ombudsman in order to initiate the ombudsman’s procedure to ques­
tion the constitutionality of a legal provision before the Constitutional 
Court. As a result of the introduction of the new types of constitutional 
complaint, ordinary courts must also show an elevated awareness to 
questions of constitutionality among the ordinary waves of legal adju­
dication with regard to the new control mechanism that easily sheds 
light on the deficiencies of fundamental rights’ adjudication. Judicial 
referral as it existed formerly stayed in force, which means that judges 
in pending cases turn to the Constitutional Court in case they state that 
an applicable piece of law is unconstitutional [1].
1.1. Until the Fundamental Law has entered into force, approxi­
mately 1,600 actions were brought annually in the Constitutional Court 
within the framework of the abstract ex-post facto review of law (actio 
popularis) procedure [2], which had no standing requirement. The ordi­
nary courts adjudicated violations of the rights of the individual, while 
the primary duty of the Constitutional Court was to review the consti­
tutionality of laws and regulations. Even in the procedure of constitu­
tional complaint or judicial referral, the Constitutional Court could only 
investigate the unconstitutionality of the challenged law or regulation, 
and this investigation did not have as a mandatory consequence the 
retroactive exclusion of the applicability of the unconstitutional law or 
regulation in the given case [3].
The essence of actio popularis is that it was not necessary that 
the petitioner had any interest in the success of the proceeding, mean­
ing that it was not necessary for that person to be affected. For the 
most part, the countries establishing the opportunity for actio popularis 
come from the line of post-socialist nations. Actio popularis could be 
the most important tool of direct democracy in a transitional democ­
racy [4]. In the peaceful and effective management of transitioning 
into a constitutional democracy, constitutional observations by citizens 
affecting legislative activity may have a significant role, and this form
of participation in exercising power may also greatly invigorate public 
sentiment and the sense of joint action. Thus, the introduction of actio 
popularis in Hungaiy also reflected a kind of philosophy of democracy.
As a consequence, instead of protecting rights while adjudicating 
specific cases, abstract constitutional review was the duty of the Con­
stitutional Court [5]. The Constitution and the over 20 years of constitu­
tional practice interpreting it demonstrated that the democratic protec­
tion of the rule of law was in the interest of all members of the society. 
This was the assumption behind the legal instrument adopted by Art. 
32/A para. 4 of Act XX of 1949 (the Constitution), the so-called actio 
popular is.Ѵле vast majority of the Constitutional Court’s work con­
sisted of the adjudication of these ex post facto abstract constitutional 
reviews, which could have been initiated by anyone [6].
Over the course of the past 20 years, in spite of the inherent values, 
actio popularis had become one of the most disputed elements in Hun­
garian Constitutional Court practice; one of the reasons for this was — 
as suggested by even the president of the Constitutional Court — the 
unbearable workload, inhibiting the adjudication of the cases within 
a reasonable period of time. Although actio popularis is not a shared 
European minimum requirement in the area of reviewing the constitu­
tionality of laws and regulations, the Venice Commission of the Council 
of Europe stated that in Hungaiy the actio popularis was indeed able 
to filter out unconstitutional laws and regulations adopted prior to the 
effective date of the Constitution, during the years immediately follow­
ing the political transition [7].
1.2. The Fundamental Law, however, introduced another form 
of protecting constitutionality; it eliminated the actio popularis, and 
enabled the bringing of an action on the basis of individual standing 
within the framework of a constitutional complaint, not only concern­
ing unconstitutional decisions deriving from the application of an 
unconstitutional law or regulation, but also versus decisions or pro­
ceedings of ordinary courts violating the constitutional rights of the 
petitioners [8]. In Hungarian legal literature, actio popularis has often 
been presented as contraiy to the proceeding initiated in the form of a 
constitutional complaint [9]. The basis of the comparison was that in
the case of actio popularis there are no admissibility/standing criteria 
for the review of constitutionality; while in the case of a constitutional 
complaint the institutions conducting the review always expect that the 
initiating party be somehow involved in the case. In the case of the 
constitutional complaint, the primary objective of the complainants is 
to obtain legal remedy for their own case, reaching the improvement of 
their own personal or financial position. The result of the proceeding 
can be the annulment of the unconstitutional law, just as in the case of 
the actio popularis based on abstract review of the law; however, the 
annulment of the unconstitutional law from the perspective of the com­
plainant is merely a tool to obtain legal redress in his/her/its own case. 
To the contrary, in actio popularis the service of public interest, not the 
service of private interest forms the backdrop.
Although the two scopes of review can be contrasted from this 
perspective, the actio popularis and the constitutional law complaint 
are still not alternatives to each other; doctrinally, there is no obstacle 
to employing them side-by-side. In spite of this fact, in jurisprudence, 
the two legal institutions do not operate simultaneously in any national 
legal system. One partial reason for this is the workload limit of the 
authorities conducting the constitutionality review. A constitutional 
complaint with a broad scope and actio popularis can not be employed 
in most countries without expensive structural expansions and opera­
tional reforms in such a way that the cases could be resolved within a 
reasonable length of time.
Contrary to actio popularis — the essence of which is that the 
Constitutional Court accepts a motion as long as the petitioner indi­
cates which law or regulation is deemed unconstitutional and explains 
intelligently why — the substantive element of the constitutional law 
complaint is to set up the system of admissibility criteria, the essence of 
which is that a law can be annuled only when its application in a spe­
cific case has led to a specific violation of a fundamental right [10]. The 
admissibility criteria help that actio popularis and constitutional com­
plaints, aiming at another instance of personal remedy by the annul­
ment of a legal provision, could be separated. Thus in Hungary from 
2012 January, one can only request the abolition of an unconstitutional 
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law in the framework of a constitutional law complaint, if the merit of 
the complainant’s case in front of the ordinary court is significantly 
affected by the challenged law. Constitutional complaints can only be 
initiated in case of violation of the rights and freedoms of the complain­
ant, while the actio popularis proceeding was open for anybody if the 
legal provision violated any constitutional provision.
The constitutional complaint and the actio popularis may work 
with similar effectiveness regarding the filtering out of unconstitutional 
laws and regulations in the legal system. However, while the constitu­
tional complaint, as a strong point, is able to redress individual viola­
tions of rights as well, it was a unique characteristic, a strong point of 
actio popularis that the petitioner there acted in the interest of (main­
taining) constitutional democracy. In Hungary the actio popularis as a 
legal institution relied on the participation of people taking action in the 
interest of the public. This phenomenon of direct democracy ceased to 
exist in the Hungarian law.
1.3. Pursuant to Section 24 para 2 (c) of the Fundamental Law, on 
the basis of a constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court reviews 
the compliance of the law or regulation applied in the given case with 
the Fundamental Law (old type and direct constitutional complaint). 
Pursuant to Section 24 para 2 (d) of the Fundamental Law, on the basis 
of the constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court also reviews 
the compliance of the court decision with the Fundamental Law (new 
type, real or genuine constitutional complaint). By unfolding the rules 
contained in the Fundamental Law, the new Act on the Constitutional 
Court (ConstCourt Act) [II] established three categories of constitu­
tional complaints.
The so called «old type» complaint Pursuant to Section 26 para 1 of 
the ConstCourt Act according to Section 24 para 2 (c) of the Fundamen­
tal Law, a person or organisation affected in an individual case may turn 
to the Constitutional Court with a constitutional complaint, as long as, 
over the course of the application of an unconstitutional law in the court 
proceeding conducted in the matter, a violation of his/her/its rights has 
occured and he/she/it had already exhausted available legal remedies or
legal redress as such is not available. This is what practitioners usually 
call «the old type» or «Section 26. para 1» constitutional complaint.
The so called «direct» complaint Pursuant to Section 26 para 2 of 
the ConstCourt Act, unlike in Para (1), as an exception, the proceeding 
of the Constitutional Court can be initiated when -by virtue of the appli­
cation or effect of the unconstitutional provision — the violation of the 
filing party’s rights had occurred directly, without a court decision, and 
no legal remedy is available to redress the unconstitutional situation, 
or the petitioners had already exhausted their legal remedies. This is 
what practitioners call a «direct» or «Section 26 para 2» constitutional 
complaint.
The so called «real» or «genuine» complaint Pursuant to Section 
27 of the ConstCourt Act, according to Section 24 para 2 (d) of the Fun­
damental Law, the affected person or organisation in a given case can 
turn to the Constitutional Court against a court decision that is contrary 
to the Fundamental Law, if the final case decision made regarding the 
merits or other decision finally terminating a court proceeding violates 
the rights of the complainants enshrined in the Fundamental Law and 
the petitioners had already exhausted their legal remedies or no legal 
remedies had been made available. This is what practitioners call a 
«real», «genuine»or «Section 27.» constitutional complaint.
This type o f constitutional complaint is well known from German 
law and has been a desired legal institution by many for a long time in 
Hungary [12]. Its practice— the activity of the Bundesverfassungsgeri­
cht of reviewing the decisions of ordinary courts from a constitutional­
ity perspective —- certainly eases the development of uniform standards 
of constitutionality to be applied by the courts.The institution of the real 
constitutional complaint seemed to be of crucial importance because it 
created an opportunity for the Constitutional Court to monitor the activ­
ity of ordinaty courts besides monitoring the activity of the legislator. 
The review is conducted from a constitutional perspective; the Consti­
tutional Court has to adjudicate whether the interpretation of e.g. civil 
law, administrative law or criminal law complied with the Fundamental 
Law.
2. Post-communist constitutional development is far from com­
plete. Hungary as well face constantly emerging old and new problems, 
one of which is — quite a new one — how fundamental rights apply in 
private relations and how constitutionality could be enforced in private 
matters by constitutional adjudication? The introduction of the above 
mentioned new types of constitutional complaint caused great turbu­
lence concerning this nowadays highly relevant subject-matter of the 
European constitutional law.
2.1. The problem of the application of constitutional rights in pri­
vate matters arises in many modem democracies. What does constitu­
tionalism in the contemporary word command for the assessment of 
private relations? How are constitutional rules binding if they are bind­
ing at all in certain private relations?
We learn from the American concept of „state action» where fun­
damental rights apply primarily in the relation of the state and the indi­
vidual, but in the jurisprudence more and more situations amount to be 
situated in the constitutional sphere [13]. We leam from the German 
concept of third party effect, the Drittwirkung, that stands on the idea 
that private law has to be interpreted in the light of the Basic Law. 
This means that judges cannot refer directly to the Basic Law, to put is 
simply, the Basic Law is only an interpretative tool to other legal provi­
sions in the hand of the ordinary judge [14]. We also leam for the idea 
of direct horizontal effect of consitutional rights that works in Poland or 
in Ireland for example [15]. These jurisprudences allow judges to apply 
constitutional right as the only legal basis of their decisions.
The eternal question underneath the universality of constitutional­
ism is whether the classical models, solutions of western democracy 
can indeed be adopted to other regions of the world and if yes, what 
way and to what extent. My answer to this question is that there must 
be a core and a penumbra (center and periphery) of the idea of consti­
tutionalism as a legal concept. I find that the core is definitely universal 
which means that there could be different interpretations of Chopin’s 
notes, but the essence must stay inviolable in a good interpretation. 
Concerning the penumbra there can be bigger differences between 
national concepts, solutions. Constitutional processes — in Hungary
and in Russia as well — must definitely be placed in the worldwide 
transitional process from authoratarianism to constitutional democracy.
This means for example — applied to the question of the appli­
cation of constitutional rights in private matters — that it certainly 
belongs to the core of the idea of the protection of fundamental rights 
that constitutional rights apply and must be protected by the state in 
private matters as well. The question is how and what far is it possible 
and what could be the role of constitutional adjudication?
It is evident that states can always implement rules in order to pro­
tect defenseless individuals from the derogatory conduct the state and 
also of other private entities and individuals. The legislation must com­
ply with the so far best developed and universally accepted standard of 
proportionality. Private law provisions and the fairly new anti-discrimi­
nation legislations worldwide bring good examples for this.
As the state has this regulatory power, in most of the cases brought 
to the courts, it is not necessary to invoke one’s fundamental rights 
granted by the constitution; in ordinary legal debates, it is enough to 
call for a statutory provision when seeking legal protection. This is why 
the application of constitutional rights in private disputes is a «residual 
category», which means that the application of constitutional rights 
occurs only if ordinary legislation fails to protect fundamental rights.
But what are the requirements of this „horizontal» application, 
what amounts to be the „constitutional interpretation of the law» and 
who decides on these requirements? Due to the introduction of the new 
constitutional complaint mechanisms, Hungary nowadays is right on 
the track to give answers to this dilemma. This „obscure phenomenon» 
was always on the horizon of Hungarian constitutional law, but got cen­
tral attention with the introduction of the new constitutional complaint 
mechanisms, the change in constitutional adjudication as discussed 
above. With the introduction of the possibility of the supervision of the 
decisions of ordinary courts from the perspective of constitutionality, 
the Constitutional Court got new competences in the supervision of the 
enforcement of fundamental rights in private matters as well.
The new Civil Code adopted in March 2013 mentions that civil law 
must be interpreted in conformity with the Fundamental Law. All this in
mind, ordinary judges have to decide on how and to what extent consti­
tutional rights apply to private relations, if they could be referred to as 
the individual legal basis of a decision or they are necessary interpreta­
tive tools, and ultimately it is up to the Constitutional Court to supervise 
upon a petition, on a case-by- case basis, whether or not the position of 
the court was in conformity with the Fundamental Law. This is a way a 
solution of a conflict and later a judicial practice could be bom in case 
there is a respect for cooperative constitutionalism.
2.2. The development of constitutional democracy following 
the political transition in 1989 was effectively assisted by the legal 
institution of actio popularis. Hungary could be an example for how 
constitutional protection operates smoothly as a result of the mostly 
public-interest driven action of natural and legal persons. Actio popu­
laris ceased to exist. The new system of the German type constitutional 
complaint mechanisms enable the monitoring of the constitutionality of 
court decisions simultaneously with the constitutional review of laws 
and regulations.
The idea, that it is not only the legislative acts but also the court 
proceedings, including certain questions of interpretation, can be super­
vised by the Constitutional Court from the perspective of constitution­
ality, may serve the application of fundamental rights in private matters 
as well, a core question of the protection of fundamental rights.
However, since January 2012, only one single case ended with 
the annulment of a court decision by the Constitutional Court under 
this new competence. The case was not based on a private law debate, 
although the greatest part of the petitions are of this kind [16]. The 
decision was bom in March 2013 and concerned a matter of the right 
to demonstration. The Constitutional Court stated that ordinary court 
hindered the demonstration with its unlawful procedure [17]. As to the 
question of the application of fundamental rights in private matters 
what we already know is cases when a problem of the petitioner do not 
amount to be a constitutional rights problem according to the Constitu­
tional Court [18].
The Fundamental Law — besides all the well founded critics — 
has made a great step towards the enforcement of the constitutional
rights also in private matters with opening up the possibility for consti­
tutional complaint against a court decision. This pressure on ordinary 
courts cannot be bad for the purposes of constitutionality, even if it 
stays primarily — further on — the task of ordinary court to find the 
proper balance between the enforcement of the purposes of the Civil 
Code and the Fundamental Law.
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